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Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games

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  • Roy Chen

    (National University of Singapore)

  • Yan Chen

    (University of Michigan
    Tsinghua University)

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto

    (Nanyang Technological University)

Abstract

Recently, social science research replicability has received close examination, with discussions revolving around the degree of success in replicating experimental results. We lend insight to the replication discussion by examining the quality of replication studies. We examine how even a seemingly minor protocol deviation in the experimental process (Camerer et al. in Science 351(6280):143–1436, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf0918 ), the removal of common information, can lead to a finding of “non-replication” of the results from the original study (Chen and Chen in Am Econ Rev 101(6):2562–2589, 2011). Our analysis of the data from the original study, its replication, and a series of new experiments shows that, with common information, we obtain the original result in Chen and Chen (2011), whereas without common information, we obtain the null result in Camerer et al. (2016). Together, we use our findings to propose a set of procedure recommendations to increase the quality of replications of laboratory experiments in the social sciences.

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Chen & Yan Chen & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021. "Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 2-30, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:24:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09658-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Replication; Common information; Coordination games; Group identity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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