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Conditional cooperation in a sequential move game

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  • Francesco Farina

    ()

  • Patrizia Sbriglia

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12232-007-0037-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 149-165

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Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:149-165

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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12232

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Related research

Keywords: Social preference; Conditional cooperation; Experiments; Poisson regression; A13; C72; C91; C92;

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References

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  1. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow, 2005. "Strategy Choice and Cognitive Ability in Field Experiments," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-034, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Simon Gächter & Christian Thöni, 2005. "Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation Among Like-Minded People," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 303-314, 04/05.
  4. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  5. Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 269-87.
  6. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November.
  7. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  8. Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April.
  9. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  10. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
  11. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C1-C33, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Farina, Francesco & O'Higgins, Niall & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2008. "Eliciting Motives for Trust and Reciprocity by Attitudinal and Behavioural Measures," IZA Discussion Papers 3584, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Pickhardt, Michael, 2010. "A few can do: Ethical behavior and the provision of public goods in an agent-based model," CAWM Discussion Papers 37, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.

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