Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Control; Laboratory experiments; Motivation; Principal-agent theory; C81; C91; M52;
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- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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