Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Common-pool resources; Asymmetry; Irrigation; Fairness; Real-time experiment; C91; C92; Q25; Q57;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
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