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Addressing Agency Problem in Employee Training: The Role of Goal Congruence

Author

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  • Vandana Madhavan

    (Amrita School of Business Kochi, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Coimbatore 641112, India)

  • Murale Venugopalan

    (Amrita School of Business Kochi, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Coimbatore 641112, India)

  • Bhumika Gupta

    (Research Lab: LITEM, Management, Marketing, and Strategy, Institute Mines-Telecom Business School, 91011 Evry, France
    Alliance School of Business, Alliance University, Bangaluru 562106, India)

  • Gyanendra Singh Sisodia

    (College of Business Administration, Ajman University, Ajman 20550, United Arab Emirates)

Abstract

Individualized learning plans and corresponding training programs are maintained and organized in most organizations. Employees may be averse to training if they do not see how it contributes to their professional advancement. This is an example of conflict between management and employee interests in a business. The misalignment between management’s offerings and employees’ desires is a significant factor contributing to such a situation. Our research focused on how companies and individuals put training resources to use from a perspective of divergent goals. It provides insights into making employee training more effective. We investigate the relationship between organizational, individual, and training efficacy using the principal–agent theory and the concept of bounded rationality. We attempted to validate three a priori conditions relating to goal congruence, training motivation, and decision-making through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. As per participant inputs, career aspirations drive employees’ training preferences. The significance of goal congruence in achieving corporate objectives is often neglected in the academic literature. Although goal congruence can be a useful tool in assisting organizations in achieving their stated objectives, enhanced communication and discussion between managers and employees are required in order to improve and align employee goals with the company’s, for the sake of the individual’s and organization’s development. Furthermore, firms should invest in technology-enabled learning that ensures better access to learning, in order to achieve the kind of productivity and profit margins that would benefit everyone involved. We have also proposed a training value transaction model that accommodates the diverse interests. The model depicts the role of goal congruence in enhanced value fulfilment of the principals as well as agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Vandana Madhavan & Murale Venugopalan & Bhumika Gupta & Gyanendra Singh Sisodia, 2023. "Addressing Agency Problem in Employee Training: The Role of Goal Congruence," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-27, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:3745-:d:1072396
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    References listed on IDEAS

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