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Paper provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 04-0108.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:04-0108

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1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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3. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Megginson, William L & Weiss, Kathleen A, 1991. " Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 879-903, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. James M. Mahoney & Chamu Sundaramurthy & Joseph T. Mahoney, 1997. "The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 349-365.
6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
8. Aloke Ghosh, 2004. "Increasing Market Share as a Rationale for Corporate Acquisitions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(1-2), pages 209-247. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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10. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-52, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 2532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Randall Morck & Andrel Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 52, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
11. Amit, Raphael & Brander, James & Zott, Christoph, 1998. "Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 441-466, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
14. Willard T. Carleton & James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1335-1362, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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