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Scholar-participated governance as an alternative solution to the problem of collective action in social-ecological systems

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  • Yang, Lihua
  • Wu, Jianguo

Abstract

Different from the three classical and popular models of central authority, privatization, and self-governance--which have been widely researched and applied in social-ecological policymaking in recent years, we propose an alternative model for collective action to resolve the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Our study is based on a series of game theoretic analyses and a field study of combating desertification in seven counties in Northwest China. The results show that scholars who have comparative advantages in knowledge and information over other social actors (such as herders and governments) can help game players resolve their collective action dilemma in social-ecological systems under certain conditions. This positive outcome can be achieved mainly through the participation of scholars as information providers, governmental agents, scholar-entrepreneurs, and pure game players.

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  • Yang, Lihua & Wu, Jianguo, 2009. "Scholar-participated governance as an alternative solution to the problem of collective action in social-ecological systems," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2412-2425, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:68:y:2009:i:8-9:p:2412-2425
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    Cited by:

    1. Ison, Ray & Blackmore, Chris & Iaquinto, Benjamin L., 2013. "Towards systemic and adaptive governance: Exploring the revealing and concealing aspects of contemporary social-learning metaphors," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-42.
    2. Hong Chang & Xinchao Liu & Yu Xie & Yahong Liu & Wu Yang & Jianming Niu, 2022. "The Grassland Ecological Compensation Policy Drives the Differentiation of Herders’ Livelihoods in Inner Mongolian Desert Grassland," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-15, August.
    3. Yang Liu & Qing Zhang & Qingfu Liu & Yongzhi Yan & Wanxin Hei & Deyong Yu & Jianguo Wu, 2020. "Different Household Livelihood Strategies and Influencing Factors in the Inner Mongolian Grassland," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-15, January.

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