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Incentive Mechanism of Prefabrication in Mega Projects with Reputational Concerns

Author

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  • Qianqian Shi

    (School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China)

  • Jianbo Zhu

    (School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China)

  • Marcel Hertogh

    (Faculty of Civil Engineering and Geosciences, Delft University of Technology, Stevinweg 1, 2628 CN Delft, The Netherlands)

  • Zhaohan Sheng

    (School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China)

Abstract

As one of the most important sustainability project management practices, prefabrication has been drawing increasing attention to project construction practitioners. However, due to the needs of high technology and large capital investment, there is a great challenge for suppliers to adopt prefabrication in mega project construction. Therefore, designing an adequate incentive mechanism has become a daunting task for the project owner, which aims to ensure a socially and environmentally friendly project delivery. In this study, an incentive model with reputational concerns from the perspective of the project owner was established and how this incentive affects supplier’s effort and project owner’s profit was investigated. By contrasting to the incentive model without reputational concerns, when the reputation incentive is considered in the incentive contract, both supplier’s effort and project owner’s profit increase. In addition, adding reputation incentive implies more expenses, thus the project owner may not want to take this strategy due to the potential expense increase. Therefore, the study also considered an incentive mechanism with constant total incentive intensity. By comparison, the result shows that this strategy is also useful which can improve supplier’s effort and project owner’s profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Qianqian Shi & Jianbo Zhu & Marcel Hertogh & Zhaohan Sheng, 2018. "Incentive Mechanism of Prefabrication in Mega Projects with Reputational Concerns," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-16, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:1260-:d:142133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wen Jiang & Li Yuan & Lanjun Wu & Shiyue Guo, 2019. "Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(10), pages 1-23, October.
    2. Weiping Jiang & Lirong Luo & Zezhou Wu & Jianbo Fei & Maxwell Fordjour Antwi-Afari & Tao Yu, 2019. "An Investigation of the Effectiveness of Prefabrication Incentive Policies in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-24, September.
    3. Jianbo Zhu & Miao Fang & Qianqian Shi & Peng Wang & Qian Li, 2018. "Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-15, November.
    4. Zezhou Wu & Lirong Luo & Heng Li & Ying Wang & Guoqiang Bi & Maxwell Fordjour Antwi-Afari, 2021. "An Analysis on Promoting Prefabrication Implementation in Construction Industry towards Sustainability," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(21), pages 1-21, October.
    5. Clyde Zhengdao Li & Mingcong Hu & Bing Xiao & Zhe Chen & Vivian W. Y. Tam & Yiyu Zhao, 2021. "Mapping the Knowledge Domains of Emerging Advanced Technologies in the Management of Prefabricated Construction," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-31, August.

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