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Research on Environmental Governance, Local Government Competition, and Agricultural Carbon Emissions under the Goal of Carbon Peak

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  • Yingya Yang

    (Business School, Anyang Institute of Technology, West Section of Huanghe Avenue, Anyang 455000, China)

  • Yun Tian

    (School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, No. 182, Nanhu Avenue, Wuhan 430073, China)

  • Xuhui Peng

    (Party School of the Wuxi Municipal Committee of CPC, 1 Yuanzhu Rd., Wuxi 214086, China)

  • Minhao Yin

    (School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, No. 182, Nanhu Avenue, Wuhan 430073, China)

  • Wei Wang

    (College of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, 211 Huimin Rd., Chengdu 130062, China)

  • Haiwen Yang

    (Business School, Anyang Institute of Technology, West Section of Huanghe Avenue, Anyang 455000, China)

Abstract

By introducing network game theory, this paper analyzes the internal relationship and interaction mechanism among environmental governance, local government competition, and agricultural carbon peak level. On the basis of theoretical analysis, a spatial panel model is constructed using panel data from 30 provincial-level regions in China for empirical analysis. The research finds that local governments have positive competition with respect to the agricultural carbon peak, they adopt complementary carbon peak competition strategies, and they are more inclined to take geographical distance to adjacent regions as the yardstick in the competition with respect to the agricultural carbon peak strategy. That is, when the carbon peak level of surrounding provinces increases, the carbon peak level of the region will also increase. Thus, there is a phenomenon of mutual imitation and convergence between neighboring provinces. Environmental governance has a significant positive direct effect and a positive spatial spillover effect. From the perspective of coefficient, its direct effect is significantly greater than the spatial spillover effect. Therefore, more attention should be paid to local environmental governance to promote the improvement of the agricultural carbon peak level. Furthermore, the agricultural industrial structure, fiscal decentralization, agricultural public investment, regional industrial structure, and the proportion of the rural population have significant spatial spillover effects. The agricultural industrial structure and fiscal decentralization are significantly positively correlated with the peak level of agricultural carbon while the proportion of the rural population is significantly negatively correlated with the peak level of agricultural carbon. The research results have important theoretical value for expanding the research in the field of agricultural carbon emissions and provide important practical reference for China to successfully achieve the goal of agricultural carbon peak and promote the high-quality development of agriculture

Suggested Citation

  • Yingya Yang & Yun Tian & Xuhui Peng & Minhao Yin & Wei Wang & Haiwen Yang, 2022. "Research on Environmental Governance, Local Government Competition, and Agricultural Carbon Emissions under the Goal of Carbon Peak," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-17, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jagris:v:12:y:2022:i:10:p:1703-:d:943555
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    3. Shulong Li & Zhizhang Wang, 2023. "Time, Spatial and Component Characteristics of Agricultural Carbon Emissions of China," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-16, January.
    4. Shulong Li & Zhizhang Wang, 2023. "The Effects of Agricultural Technology Progress on Agricultural Carbon Emission and Carbon Sink in China," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-21, March.

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