Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Too big to fail : origins, consequences, and outlook

Contents:

Author Info

  • Robert L. Hetzel
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The policy of too big to fail arose in part from pressures created by the lack of satisfactory bankruptcy arrangements for banks. It prevented market forces from closing banks and protected all uninsured depositors of large banks from loss in the event of failure. The consequent risk-taking behavior of banks produced the systemic instability in banking that the policy was designed to prevent. It is debatable how the Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 1991 will affect the timing of bank closures, the risk-taking behavior of banks, and the contraction of the banking industry.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1991/pdf/er770601.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): (1991)
    Issue (Month): Nov ()
    Pages: 3-15

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrer:y:1991:i:nov:p:3-15:n:v.77no.6

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.richmondfed.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/

    Related research

    Keywords: Bank failures;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    2. Rolnick, Arthur J. & Weber, Warren E., 1984. "The causes of free bank failures : A detailed examination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 267-291, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Huberto M. Ennis & H.S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 21-44.
    2. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2000. "The evolution of "too-big-to-fail" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 00-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. Walker F. Todd, 1992. "FDICIA's discount window provisions," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Dec.
    4. Stern, Gary H., 1998. "Government safety nets, banking system stability, and economic development," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-29.
    5. Brian P. Hanley, 2014. "Release of the Kraken: A Novel Money Multiplier Equation's Debut in 21st Century Banking," Papers 1401.7344, arXiv.org.
    6. Hanley, Brian P., 2012. "Release of the Kraken: A novel money multiplier equation's debut in 21st century banking," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 6(3), pages 1-25.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedrer:y:1991:i:nov:p:3-15:n:v.77no.6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (William Perkins).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.