Game-Theoretic Modeling of Electricity Markets in Central Europe
AbstractThe paper deals with the methodology of computer modeling and simulation of complex markets with electricity and related products. The methodology is presented using a particular configuration of Central European markets with decentralized trading and international electricity transfers. The modeling approach is based on pure computer numerical solution in discrete state space determined by problems on which the modeled players are expected to decide—price offered for electricity supplied to various markets, breakdown of total power generation into individual commodities (yearly band, monthly band, spinning reserve) and setting bids in auctions for cross-border profiles. Similar approach to decision-making is adopted on the buyer’s side. Buyers are expected to strive to contract power supplies in the way that is most advantageous for them. The generated state space is then analyzed using concepts of mathematical game theory. In this way, we obtain a prediction of probable decisions of modeled player s in their market competition. Finally, we present a simplified power system forecast for Central Europe for year 2009.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 4 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- AUMANN, Robert J., .
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
- Green, Kesten C., 2002. "Forecasting decisions in conflict situations: a comparison of game theory, role-playing, and unaided judgement," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 321-344.
- Martin Hrubý, 2008. "Algorithmic Approaches to Game-theoretical Modeling and Simulation," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 268-300, December.
- Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E. & Slonim, Robert L. & Barron, Greg, 2002. "Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 359-368.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Stastna).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.