Recaudador vs. contribuyente: el juego de la evasión fiscal
AbstractThis paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players' best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that “greater sanctions, the establishment of fiscal discipline, the improvement of monitoring processes, and less corruption, reduce fiscal evasion". Finally, it is established that, if sufficiently deep, progressiveness on the tax system has a beneficial impact in collection, and that economic growth provokes both, a reduction in evasion and the improvement of social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.
Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
tax evasion; game theory; fiscal policies; behaviour of economic agents; corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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