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Recaudador vs. contribuyente: el juego de la evasión fiscal

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Author Info
José Lara Pulido (El Colegio de México, A. C.)
Abstract

This paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players' best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that “greater sanctions, the establishment of fiscal discipline, the improvement of monitoring processes, and less corruption, reduce fiscal evasion". Finally, it is established that, if sufficiently deep, progressiveness on the tax system has a beneficial impact in collection, and that economic growth provokes both, a reduction in evasion and the improvement of social welfare.

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File URL: http://revistas.colmex.mx/revistas/12/art_12_1170_8887.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 313-334
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Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:22:y:2007:i:2:p:313-334

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Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/
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Related research
Keywords: tax evasion; game theory; fiscal policies; behaviour of economic agents; corruption;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Corchon, Luis C., 1992. "Tax evasion and the underground economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 445-454, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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