Acceptable Contracts, Opportunism, and Rigid Hourly Wages
AbstractThis paper presents a model of opportunism and contingent wage schedules in labor markets, which is, in a sense, intermediate between the "implicit" and explicit contract approaches. The "expected utility" condition is not a part of the contract, but is a condition for the acceptability of a contract form by employees. Contract forms are constrained by conditions that are enforcable ex post. Of the contract forms examined, the only one mutually acceptable is one with inflexible hourly wages.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 13 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (Jul-Sep)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klein, Benjamin, 1984.
"Contract Costs and Administered Prices: An Economic Theory of Rigid Wages,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 332-38, May.
- Benjamin Klein, 1984. "Contract Costs and Administered Prices: An Economic Theory of Rigid Wages," UCLA Economics Working Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Kahn, Charles M. & Green, Jerry, 1983.
3203642, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Chari, V V, 1983.
"Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 107-22, Supplemen.
- Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35, January.
- Baily, Martin Neil, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50, January.
- Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
- Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
- Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 123-56, Supplemen.
- Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, 1984.
"The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand,"
NBER Working Papers
0864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-57, April.
- Azariadis, Costas & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
- Eckalbar, John C, 1980. "The Stability of Non-Walrasian Processes: Two Examples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 371-86, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.