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Labor contracts in a model of imperfect competition

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Author Info
V.V. Chari
Larry E. Jones
Rodolfo E. Manuelli

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Abstract

We propose a definition of involuntary unemployment which differs from that traditionally used in implicit labor contract theory. We say that a worker is involuntarily unemployed if the marginal wage implied by the optimal contract exceeds the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. We construct a model where risk-neutral firms have monopoly power and show that such monopoly power is necessary for involuntary unemployment to arise in the optimal contract. We numerically compute examples and show that such unemployment occurs for a wide range of parameter values.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 117.

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Date of creation: 1989
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:117

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Keywords: Labor contract ; Unemployment ; Wages;

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  1. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Larry E. Jones & R. E. Manuelli, 1987. "The Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Theories of Recessions," Discussion Papers 753, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dale T. Mortensen, 1979. "The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game," Discussion Papers 384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Green, Jerry & Kahn, Charles M, 1983. "Wage-Employment Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 173-87, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1986. "Involuntary Unemployment and Worker Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 739-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kahn, Charles M, 1985. "Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 435-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Martin S. Feldstein, 1975. "The Importance of Temporary Layoffs: An Empirical Analysis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 6(1975-3), pages 725-745. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Prescott, Edward C., 1974. "Equilibrium search and unemployment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 188-209, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gordon, Donald F, 1974. "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 431-59, December.
  14. Chari, V V, 1983. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 107-22, Supplemen.
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