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Economic Integration and Labor Market Institutions: Worker Mobility, Earnings Risk, and Contract Structure

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  • Ronnie Schoeb

    (University of Munich)

  • David E. Wildasin

    (University of Kentucky)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of labor market integration, in the form of worker mobility, in a model with long-term labor contracts that lead to wage rigidities and unemployment. Increased mobility leads to more flexible labor market institutions in which firms can more easily vary the level of employment in response to fluctuations in demand. Economic integration is potentially Pareto-improving but, in the absence of a system of compensation, workers are harmed by greater labor mobility while the owners of firms benefit from higher profits.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Labor and Demography with number 0112002.

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Date of creation: 10 Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0112002

Note: Type of Document - ; prepared on TeX; figures: request from author
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: labor mobility economic integration unemployment implicit contracts;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Factor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in the EU: Policy Issues and Analytical Approaches," CESifo Working Paper Series 344, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Picard, Pierre M. & Wildasin, David E., 2011. "Outsourcing, labor market pooling, and labor contracts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 47-60, July.
  3. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Michael P. Devereux & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Xavier Vives, 2008. "Chapter 3: The effect of globalisation on Western European jobs: curse or blessing?," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 71-104, 02.
  4. Poutvaara, Panu, 1999. "Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  5. Jonas Agell, 2002. "On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent Seeking vs. Social Insurance," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(2), pages 107-135, 05.
  6. Jonas Agell, 2001. "Warum haben wir rigide Arbeitsmärkte? Rent-seeking versus Soziale Sicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(4), pages 363-381, November.

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