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From locality to continent: A comment on the generalization of an experimental study

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  • Kamei, Kenju

Abstract

Kocher et al. (2008) find that conditional willingness to contribute to a public good is considerably stronger at a U.S. research site, Appalachian State University, than at sites in Europe and Asia. I find that the willingness at Brown University, in Rhode Island, is not significantly different from that in Europe and Asia in Kocher et al. (2008). Clear evidence on significantly different demographic statistics between these two U.S. research sites is provided. This implies that in the experimental study of societies, or more generally in empirical studies, we need exercise care to generalize from results at a specific research site to geographically broader conclusions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).

Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 207-210

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Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:207-210

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175

Related research

Keywords: Cooperation; Experiment; Public goods; Social dilemma;

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References

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  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
  2. Martin G. Kocher & Todd L. Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Robert J. Netzer & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Conditional cooperation on three continents," Working Papers 2007-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  3. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
  4. Benedikt Herrmann & Christian Thöni, 2009. "Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 87-92, March.
  5. Louis Putterman & Jean-Robert Tyran & Kenju Kamei, 2010. "Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 10-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Ananish Chaudhuri & Tirnud Paichayontvijit, 2006. "Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(8), pages 1-14.
  7. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2011. "State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 2011-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:8:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Shaw, Philip & Vásquez, William F. & LeClair, Mark, 2013. "Intelligence and bribing behavior in a one-shot game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 91-96.
  2. Edward J Cartwright & Denise Lovett, 2013. "Leadership and conditional cooperation in public good games: What difference does the game make?," Studies in Economics 1324, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  3. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2013. "Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games," Working Papers 2013-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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