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Bureaucrats under Populism

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  • Sasso, Greg
  • Morelli, Massimo

Abstract

We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats’ incentives by analyzing a model of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a bureaucrat who implements their policy commitment, while non-populist politicians prefer a good bureaucrat with discretion. The presence of populist politicians thus determines replacement of good with bad bureaucrats and creates incentives for good bureaucrats to “feign loyalty”. We show that feigning loyalty is more prevalent when the probability of populist leadership in the future is higher and the bureaucrats’ pool of potential replacements is worse. We also show that bureaucratic turnover is higher under populists when the bureaucracy is strong and higher under non-populists when the bureaucracy is weak.

Suggested Citation

  • Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:202:y:2021:i:c:s004727272100133x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Bellodi & Frederic Docquier & Stefano Iandolo & Massimo Morelli & Riccardo Turati, 2024. "Digging Up Trenches: Populism, Selective Mobility, and the Political Polarization of Italian Municipalities," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 24216, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Luca Bellodi & Massimo Morelli & Matia Vannoni, 2021. "A Costly Commitment: Populism, Government Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9470, CESifo.
    3. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    4. Massimo Pulejo, 2023. "Pro-Social Backlash: The Effect of Far-Right Success on Voluntary Welfare Provision," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23214, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords; Populism; Bureaucracy; Principal-Agent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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