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Market mechanism and expectations in minority and majority games

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  • Marsili, Matteo
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    Abstract

    We present a derivation of the minority game from a market mechanism. This shows that the minority nature of the interaction crucially depends on the expectation model of agents. The same market mechanism with different expectations leads indeed to the majority game. We study in detail the minority game without information and clarify the role of initial conditions on the dynamics. The stronger and the more heterogeneous the prior beliefs which agents hold on the best choice, the more efficient is the final stationary state. We also review the effect of market impact. Finally we discuss mixed minority–majority games in order to address the issue of whether the dynamics of the market satisfies the expectations of agents. We find that in both a minority and a majority game expectations are self-fulfilled.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.

    Volume (Year): 299 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 93-103

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:299:y:2001:i:1:p:93-103

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    Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/

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    References

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    1. Johannes Berg & Matteo Marsili & Aldo Rustichini & Riccardo Zecchina, 2001. "Statistical mechanics of asset markets with private information," Papers cond-mat/0101351, arXiv.org.
    2. Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2001. "Stylized facts of financial markets and market crashes in Minority Games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 294(3), pages 514-524.
    3. Carl Chiarella, 1992. "The Dynamics of Speculative Behaviour," Working Paper Series 13, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    4. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    5. Challet, D. & Zhang, Y.-C., 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 407-418.
    6. D. Challet & A. Chessa & M. Marsili & Y. -C. Zhang, 2000. "From Minority Games to real markets," Papers cond-mat/0011042, arXiv.org.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Gao, Yan & Li, Honggang, 2011. "A consolidated model of self-fulfilling expectations and self-destroying expectations in financial markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 368-381, March.
    2. Mello, Bernardo A. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2008. "Minority games, diversity, cooperativity and the concept of intelligence," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(2), pages 557-566.
    3. Challet, Damien, 2008. "Inter-pattern speculation: Beyond minority, majority and $-games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-100, January.
    4. Ginestra Bianconi & Tobias Galla & Matteo Marsili, 2006. "Effects of Tobin Taxes in Minority Game markets," Papers cond-mat/0603134, arXiv.org.
    5. Bianconi, Ginestra & Galla, Tobias & Marsili, Matteo & Pin, Paolo, 2009. "Effects of Tobin taxes in minority game markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 231-240, May.
    6. Chen, Fang & Gou, Chengling & Guo, Xiaoqian & Gao, Jieping, 2008. "Prediction of stock markets by the evolutionary mix-game model," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(14), pages 3594-3604.
    7. Damien Challet & Tobias Galla, 2004. "Price return auto-correlation and predictability in agent-based models of financial markets," Papers cond-mat/0404264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2004.
    8. Kiniwa, Jun & Koide, Takeshi & Sandoh, Hiroaki, 2009. "Analysis of price behavior in lazy $-game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 388(18), pages 3879-3891.
    9. Andre Cardoso Barato & Iacopo Mastromatteo & Marco Bardoscia & Matteo Marsili, 2011. "Impact of meta-order in the Minority Game," Papers 1112.3908, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2012.
    10. Lustosa, Bernardo C. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2010. "Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(6), pages 1230-1238.

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