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Credit and identity theft

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Author Info
Kahn, Charles M.
Roberds, William

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Abstract

The quintessential crime of the information age is identity theft, the malicious use of personal identifying data. In this paper we model "identity" and its use in credit transactions. Various types of identity theft occur in equilibrium, including "new account fraud," "existing account fraud," and "friendly fraud." The equilibrium incidence of identity theft represents a tradeoff between a desire to avoid costly or invasive monitoring of individuals on the one hand, and the need to control transactions fraud on the other. Our results suggest that technological advances will not eliminate this tradeoff.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBW-4PJ0525-1/1/20538fc2efe7f6b7cd47c7f12e6a9068
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 251-264
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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:2:p:251-264

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Edward J. Green & Warren Weber, 1996. "Will the New $100 Bill Decrease Counterfeiting?," Macroeconomics 9609003, EconWPA, revised 11 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kocherlakota, Narayana & Wallace, Neil, 1998. "Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 272-289, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Araujo, Luis, 2004. "Social norms and money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-256, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2000. "A theory of transactions privacy," Working Paper 2000-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Townsend, Robert M, 1989. "Currency and Credit in a Private Information Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1323-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edward J. Green & Warren E. Weber, 1996. "Will the new $100 bill decrease counterfeiting?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-10. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ed Nosal & Neil Wallace, 2004. "A model of (the threat of) counterfeiting," Working Paper 0401, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Taub, Bart, 1994. "Currency and Credit Are Equivalent Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 921-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2005. "Money Is Privacy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 377-399, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2004. "Money is privacy," Working Paper 2004-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Neil Wallace, 1999. "A model of private bank-note issue," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 104-136, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Peter Burns & Anne Stanley, 2002. "Fraud management in the credit card industry," Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper 02-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  16. Lee McIntyre, 2000. "Making money keeps getting easier," Regional Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Q2, pages 18-24. [Downloadable!]
  17. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Kahn, Charles M., 1993. "Exclusion and moral hazard : The case of identical demand," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 217-235, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2007. "Optimal pricing of payment services when cash is an alternative," Working Papers 07-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stacey L. Schreft, 2007. "Risks of identity theft: Can the market protect the payment system?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-40. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and the no-surcharge rule," Working Paper 2006-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  4. Antoine Martin & Michael Orlando & David Skeie, 2008. "Payment networks in a search model of money," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 104-132, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Marianne Crowe & Scott Schuh & Joanna Stavins, 2006. "Consumer behavior and payment choice: a conference summary," Public Policy Discussion Paper 06-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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