This paper presents a monetary-theoretic model to study the implications of networks' collection of personal identifying data and data security on each other's incidence and costs of identity theft. To facilitate trade, agents join clubs (networks) that compile and secure data. Too much data collection and too little security arise in equilibrium with noncooperative networks compared with the efficient allocation. A number of potential remedies are analyzed: mandated limits on the amount of data collected, mandated security levels, reallocations of data-breach costs, and data sharing through a merger of the networks.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number
2008-22.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2005.
"Money Is Privacy,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 377-399, 05.
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Charles M. Kahn & James McAndrews & William Roberds, 2004.
"Money is privacy,"
Working Paper
2004-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[Downloadable!]