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Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

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  • Dean Corbae

    ()

  • Joseph Ritter

    ()

Abstract

We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest. With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for co-existence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0418-8
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 933-951

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:933-951

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Search frictions; Partnerships; Gift-giving.;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Pingle, Mark & Mukhopadhyay, Sankar, 2010. "Private money as a competing medium of exchange," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 541-554, June.
  2. Monnet, Cyril & Roberds, William, 2008. "Optimal pricing of payment services," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1428-1440, November.
  3. Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2006. "The economics of payments," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb.
  4. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and Identity Theft," 2006 Meeting Papers 34, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Antoine Martin & Michael Orlando & David Skeie, 2008. "Payment networks in a search model of money," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 104-132, January.
  6. Bignon, Vincent & Breton, RĂ©gis & Rojas Breu, Mariana, 2013. "Currency Union with and without Banking Union," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12105, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2007. "Optimal pricing of payment services when cash is an alternative," Working Papers 07-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  8. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
  9. Shouyong Shi, 2006. "A Microfoundation of Monetary Economics," Working Papers tecipa-211, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and the no-surcharge rule," Working Paper 2006-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

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