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Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

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  • Gilles, Robert P.
  • Sarangi, Sudipta

Abstract

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson-Wolinsky's concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson's consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 181-185

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:3:p:181-185

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

Related research

Keywords: Social networks Network formation Pairwise stability Trust Self-confirming equilibrium;

References

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Francis Bloch, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers 2004.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles, 2007. "Network potentials," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 13-52, June.
  5. Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005. "Networks and farsighted stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February.
  6. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2006. "Farsightedly Stable Networks," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
  9. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social Network Formation with Consent," Discussion Paper 2004-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gilles, Robert P. & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2012. "Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 159-165.
  2. Gilles, R.P. & Lazarova, E.A. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2011. "Economic Institutions and Stability: A Network Approach," Discussion Paper 2011-084, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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