Proper scoring rules with arbitrary value functions
AbstractAbstract A scoring rule is proper if it elicits an expert's true beliefs as a probabilistic forecast, and it is strictly proper if it uniquely elicits an expert's true beliefs. The value function associated with a (strictly) proper scoring rule is (strictly) convex on any convex set of beliefs. This paper gives conditions on compact sets of possible beliefs [Theta] that guarantee that every continuous value function on [Theta] is the value function associated with some strictly proper scoring rule. Compact subsets of many parametrized sets of distributions on satisfy these conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Expert opinions Elicitation Proper scoring rules Value functions Convex extensions of functions Bauer simplexes Choquet' s theorem;
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