On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
AbstractWe introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 41 (2005)
Issue (Month): 8 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Other versions of this item:
- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Discussion Paper Series dp360, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
- Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
- Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2005.
"Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp410, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series dp376, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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