Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
AbstractLet A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let R N be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let u N be a profile of utility functions for R N. We define the NTU game V uN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m � 3 and it may be empty for m � 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m � 5 and it may be empty for m � 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of R N is nonempty, provided that k � n + 2.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp410.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 32, pp. 857-872.
NTU game; voting game; majority rule; bargaining set;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-12-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2005-12-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-12-20 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter, 2005.
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- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Discussion Paper Series dp360, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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- Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.
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