Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ron Holzman

    ()

  • Bezalel Peleg

    ()

  • Peter Sudholter

    ()

Abstract

Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let R N be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let u N be a profile of utility functions for R N. We define the NTU game V uN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m � 3 and it may be empty for m � 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m � 5 and it may be empty for m � 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of R N is nonempty, provided that k � n + 2.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp410.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp410.

as in new window
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 32, pp. 857-872.
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp410

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem
Phone: +972-2-6584135
Fax: +972-2-6513681
Email:
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: NTU game; voting game; majority rule; bargaining set;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gaertner,Wulf, 2006. "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521028745.
  2. Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter, 2005. "On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1060-1068, December.
  3. Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
  4. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilan Nehama).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.