AbstractA mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics of these contracts are given.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (1983)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1982. "Severance Pay, Pensions, and Efficient Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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