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Firing costs, severance payments, judicial mistakes and unemployment

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Stähler, Nikolai

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Abstract

In the discussion about employment protection, little attention has been given to judicial mistakes. In most countries, only in the case of dismissals due to economic reasons, the employee is entitled to a severance payment. Given judicial mistakes when reviewing a dismissal, shirkers might falsely receive a severance payment while non-shirker might not. At fighting unemployment, increasing the level of severance payments can increase employment for small judicial mistakes and effectively dominate the pure firing costs which leave ambiguous effects on employment. For large judicial mistakes, the opposite can hold and severance payments can decrease employment.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2008)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1162-1178
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Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:15:y:2008:i:6:p:1162-1178

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Related research
Keywords: J 41 J 64 J 65 J 68 Employment protection Judicial mistakes Matching models Shirking Unemployment;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dean Baker & Andrew Glyn & David Howell & John Schmitt, 2002. "Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence," SCEPA Working Papers 2002-17, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003. "The Economics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1999. "Microeconomic perspectives on aggregate labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 2985-3028 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fella, Giulio, 2000. "Efficiency wage and efficient redundancy pay," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1473-1490, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pietro Garibaldi & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 799-832, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Broersma, Lourens & Van Ours, Jan C., 1999. "Job searchers, job matches and the elasticity of matching," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 77-93, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. repec:fth:prinin:444 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Goerke, Laszlo, 2002. "On dismissal pay," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 497-512, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Riphahn, Regina T., 2004. "Employment protection and effort among German employees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 353-357, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Garibaldi, Pietro, 1998. "Job flow dynamics and firing restrictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-275, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jose Galdon-Sanchez & Maia Guell, 2000. "Let's go to court! Firing costs and dismissal conflicts," Working Papers 823, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  15. Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2005. "Berufliche Weiterbildung "on-the-job" und Auflösung von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen," Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor 04-22, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  16. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. E. Galdon-Sanchez, Jose & Guell, Maia, 2003. "Dismissal conflicts and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 323-335, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Olivier Blanchard & Pedro Portugal, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steffen Ahrens & Dennis Wesselbaum, 2009. "On the Introduction of Firing Costs," Kiel Working Papers 1559, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
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