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Regulatory trade-offs in the design of concession contracts

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  • Crampes, Claude
  • Estache, Antonio

Abstract

The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Utilities Policy.

Volume (Year): 7 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-13

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:1-13

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30478

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References

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  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
  3. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
  5. David MARTIMORT, 1992. "Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 28, pages 1-37.
  6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
  7. Crampes, Claude & Estache, Antonio, 1996. "Regulating Water Concessions," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
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Cited by:
  1. Thorsten Beckers & Christian von Hirschhausen & Jan Peter Klatt, . "Reformbedarf bei den Bundesfernstraßen und das Potential des PPP-Ansatzes," Working Papers 2006-03, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI), revised 19 Jun 2006.
  2. Estache, Antonio & Quesada, Lucia, 2001. "Concession contract renegotiations : some efficiency versus equity dilemmas," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2705, The World Bank.
  3. de Rus, Gines, 2000. "Infraestructuras: ¿Qué podemos decir los economistas?
    [Infrastructure: what can the economists say?]    ," MPRA Paper 12194, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Marques, Rui Cunha & Berg, Sanford V, 2010. "Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries," MPRA Paper 32890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Sudong Ye & Robert Tiong, 2003. "Tariff adjustment frameworks for privately financed infrastructure projects," Construction Management & Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 409-419.

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