Regulatory trade-offs in the design of concession contracts
AbstractThe paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Utilities Policy.
Volume (Year): 7 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30478
Other versions of this item:
- Crampes, C. & Estache, A., 1997. "Regulatory Trade-Offs in the Design of Concession Contracts," Papers 97.462, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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