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Regulatory Trade-Offs in the Design of Concession Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Crampes, C.
  • Estache, A.

Abstract

The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.

Suggested Citation

  • Crampes, C. & Estache, A., 1997. "Regulatory Trade-Offs in the Design of Concession Contracts," Papers 97.462, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.462
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    Cited by:

    1. Asheem Shrestha & Jolanta Tamošaitienė & Igor Martek & M Reza Hosseini & David J Edwards, 2019. "A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-18, November.
    2. Yichen Peng & Jing Zhou & Qiang Xu & Xiaoling Wu, 2014. "Cost Allocation in PPP Projects: An Analysis Based on the Theory of “Contracts as Reference Points”," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2014, pages 1-6, May.
    3. Phill Wheat & Alexander D. Stead & Yue Huang & Andrew Smith, 2019. "Lowering Transport Costs and Prices by Competition: Regulatory and Institutional Reforms in Low Income Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-19, October.
    4. Reus, Lorenzo & Munoz, Francisco D. & Moreno, Rodrigo, 2018. "Retail consumers and risk in centralized energy auctions for indexed long-term contracts in Chile," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 566-577.
    5. Estache, Antonio & Quesada, Lucia, 2001. "Concession contract renegotiations : some efficiency versus equity dilemmas," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2705, The World Bank.
    6. de Rus, Gines, 2000. "Infraestructuras: ¿Qué podemos decir los economistas? [Infrastructure: what can the economists say?]," MPRA Paper 12194, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Marques, Rui Cunha & Berg, Sanford V, 2010. "Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries," MPRA Paper 32890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Wang, Grace W.Y. & Pallis, Athanasios A., 2014. "Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-174.
    9. Sudong Ye & Robert Tiong, 2003. "Tariff adjustment frameworks for privately financed infrastructure projects," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 409-419.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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