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Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements

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  • Wang, Grace W.Y.
  • Pallis, Athanasios A.

Abstract

This paper provides a game theory foundation for port concession agreements, using the incentive mechanism design. This study identifies the post contractual moral hazard problem, and provides a model involving performance-based concession fees to align successfully the Port Authorities’ interests with those of the terminal operators. To match theory and practice, factual information of recent projects in Europe and the US is reviewed. Evidently, to avoid transaction failures in a Greenfield concession, the port authority needs to identify clearly the objectives undertaken. The port should have the ability to enforce the contract and determine the process of quality assurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Grace W.Y. & Pallis, Athanasios A., 2014. "Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-174.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:67:y:2014:i:c:p:162-174
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2014.04.008
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    22. Lu, Zhaoyang & Meng, Qiang, 2023. "Effects of asymmetric investment cost information on revenue-compensated build-operate-transfer highway contracts," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 71-92.
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