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Efficient agglomeration of spatial clubs

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  • Hochman, Oded
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    Abstract

    We investigate here the agglomeration of spatial clubs in an efficient allocation of a club economy. The literature on agglomeration has focused largely on a primary agglomeration caused by direct attraction forces. We concentrate mainly on secondary and tertiary agglomerations caused by a primary agglomeration. Initially, scale economies in the provision of club goods (CGs) lead each CG to agglomerate in facilities of its club. This primary agglomeration causes a secondary concentration of population around these facilities, which in turn brings about a tertiary agglomeration of facilities of different clubs into centers in the midst of population concentration. The agglomeration of facilities occurs only if a secondary concentration of population takes place. We analyze in detail two specific patterns of agglomeration. One is the central location pattern in which the facilities of all clubs agglomerate perfectly in the middle of the complex. The second is a triple-centered complex in which the center in the middle of the complex consists of perfectly agglomerated facilities of different clubs, each with a single facility per complex. The remaining two centers also consist of facilities of different clubs, but clubs in these centers each have two facilities per complex, one in each center. Each of these two centers is located between a boundary and the middle of the complex closer to the middle of the complex than to the boundary. The facilities in these two centers form condensed clusters of facilities that may contain residential land in between the facilities. We then show that these agglomeration patterns also characterize agglomerations in general. The literature maintains that an efficiently behaving municipality increases its tax-base. This implies that it is in the municipality's interest to achieve efficiency. The best way for a local government to achieve this desired efficiency is by partially intervening in market operations in order to internalize local externalities. Such an intervention should be limited to providing the city's infrastructure, to taxing only residential land rents and clubs' profits, to subsidizing the basic industry of the city, and to partially regulating land uses. Consequently, if the local governments of all complexes behave according to the above, the decentralization of the efficient allocation of the club economy would be attained.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

    Volume (Year): 69 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 118-135

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:69:y:2011:i:1:p:118-135

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

    Related research

    Keywords: R1 H4 Effective or ineffective agglomeration Spatial clubs Complex Configuration Collective goods Local public goods Facilities Direct and indirect attraction Primary and tertiary agglomerations Secondary population concentration;

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    References

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    1. Hochman, Oded, 1981. "Land rents, optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 59-85, February.
    2. Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Wildasin, David E., 1992. "Public facility location and urban spatial structure : Equilibrium and welfare analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 83-118, June.
    3. Arnott, Richard & Hochman, Oded & Rausser, Gordon C., 2008. "Pollution and land use: Optimum and decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 390-407, September.
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