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Fixed exchange rate credibility with heterogeneous expectations

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Author Info

  • Carlson, John A.
  • Valev, Naven

Abstract

After disinflation has been achieved, agents who form more sophisticated forecasts have lower confidence in the sustainability of a peg compared to less sophisticated agents. Furthermore, sustained financial stability leads to a declining proportion of sophisticated agents. Thus, the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime grows over time partly because fewer people pay attention to the workings of the monetary regime. These results are derived in a rules-versus-discretion model of a fixed exchange rate regime with heterogeneous agents. We provide unique supporting evidence using data on expectations and information about the monetary regime from Bulgaria's currency board.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 1712-1722

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:1712-1722

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617

Related research

Keywords: Endogenous inattention Fixed-exchange-rate credibility Heterogeneous expectations Currency boards;

References

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  1. Maurice Obstfeld, 1998. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," NBER Working Papers 3603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Carlson, John A. & Valev, Neven T., 2001. "Credibility of a new monetary regime: The currency board in Bulgaria," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 581-594, June.
  3. William A. Branch, 2004. "The Theory of Rationally Heterogeneous Expectations: Evidence from Survey Data on Inflation Expectations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 592-621, 07.
  4. Chavas, Jean-Paul, 2000. "On information and market dynamics: The case of the U.S. beef market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(5-7), pages 833-853, June.
  5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Baak, Saang Joon, 1999. "Tests for bounded rationality with a linear dynamic model distorted by heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1517-1543, September.
  7. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 1996. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Working papers 9530r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Dobrinsky, Rumen, 2000. "The Transition Crisis in Bulgaria," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(5), pages 581-602, September.
  9. Maurice Obstfeld, 1986. "Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," NBER Working Papers 1486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Haltiwanger, John C & Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 463-83, August.
  11. Bomfim, Antulio N., 2001. "Heterogeneous forecasts and aggregate dynamics," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 145-161, February.
  12. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-61, January.
  13. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1990. "Credibility and Stabilization," CEPR Discussion Papers 454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September.
  15. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
  16. Feige, Edgar L & Pearce, Douglas K, 1976. "Economically Rational Expectations: Are Innovations in the Rate of Inflation Independent of Innovations in Measures of Monetary and Fiscal Policy?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 499-522, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Brown, M. & Kirschenmann, K. & Ongena, S., 2009. "Foreign Currency Loans - Demand or Supply Driven?," Discussion Paper 2009-78, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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