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Who pays for bank insolvency?

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  • Mayes, David G.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 515-551

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:515-551

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

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References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. David C. Wheelock & Subal C. Kumbhaker, 1992. "The slack banker dances: deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s," Working Papers 1992-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  2. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?," Working Paper 2002-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  3. Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen & Daniela Klingebiel & Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001. "Is the crisis problem growing more severe?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 51-82, 04.
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action," Working Paper 2002-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  6. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000. "Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2441, The World Bank.
  7. de Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Llewellyn, David T. & Mayes , David G., 2003. "The role of market discipline in handling problem banks," Research Discussion Papers 21/2003, Bank of Finland.
  9. Glenn Hoggarth & Ricardo Reis & Victoria Saporta, 2001. "Costs of banking system instability: some empirical evidence," Bank of England working papers 144, Bank of England.
  10. Gorton, Gary, 1988. "Banking Panics and Business Cycles," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 751-81, December.
  11. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
  12. Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," CEP Discussion Papers dp0093, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  13. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
  14. Larry D. Wall, 1993. "Too-big-to-fail after FDICIA," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Jan, pages 1-14.
  15. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. De Luna-Martinez, J., 2000. "Management and Resolution of Banking Crises. Lessons from the Republic of Korea and Mexico," World Bank - Discussion Papers 413, World Bank.
  17. repec:imf:imfpdp:9705 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. James Daniel, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Bank Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 97/52, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Berger, Allen N. & King, Kathleen Kuester & O'Brien, James M., 1991. "The limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 753-783, September.
  20. Perotti, Enrico C. & Suarez, Javier, 2002. "Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1599-1622, October.
  21. Edward J. Frydl & Marc Quintyn, 2000. "The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 00/147, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Samu Peura & Esa Jokivuolle, 2004. "Simulation-based stress testing of banks’ regulatory capital adequacy," Finance 0405003, EconWPA.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David T. Llewellyn & David G. Mayes, 2004. "The role of market discipline in handling problem banks," Finance 0404020, EconWPA.
  2. DeYoung, Robert & Kowalik, Michal & Reidhill, Jack, 2013. "A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 612-627.
  3. Mälkönen , Ville, 2004. "Capital adequacy regulation and financial conglomerates," Research Discussion Papers 10/2004, Bank of Finland.
  4. Mayes, David G, 2009. "Early intervention and prompt corrective action in Europe," Research Discussion Papers 17/2009, Bank of Finland.
  5. Sonia Ondo-Ndong & Laurence Scialom, 2008. "Northern Rock: The anatomy of a crisis – the prudential lessons," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-23, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  6. David G. Mayes, 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Finance 0404015, EconWPA.
  7. Laurence Scialom, 2007. "Pour une politique d'actions correctives précoces dans l'Union européenne : les carences institutionnelles et légales," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 89(3), pages 111-121.
  8. Harrison, Ian & Anderson, Steve & Twaddle, James, 2007. "Pre-positioning for effective resolution of bank failures," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 324-341, December.
  9. Martin Cihák & Jörg Decressin, 2007. "The Case for a European Banking Charter," IMF Working Papers 07/173, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Beck, T.H.L., 2008. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers: Cross-country evidence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3508404, Tilburg University.
  11. David G. Mayes, 2008. "Avoiding the Next Crisis," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(4), pages 44-50, December.
  12. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  13. George Kaufman, 2004. "Bank regulation and foreign-owned banks," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 67, june.
  14. George G. Kaufman, 2007. "A Program for Minimizing the Private and Public Costs of Bank Failures," NFI Policy Briefs 2007-PB-11, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

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