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Too-big-to-fail after FDICIA

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  • Larry D. Wall

Abstract

This reprint of a 1993 article outlines what Congress intended the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 to accomplish. A new preface discusses FDICIA's successes and failures as well as research calling for clearer policies to deal with the problem of "too big to fail" banks.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its journal Economic Review.

Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:2010:n:v.95no.1

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Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Deposit insurance;

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References

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  1. Ellis Tallman, 1988. "Some unanswered questions about bank panics," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Nov, pages 2-21.
  2. Herbert L. Baer & Douglas D. Evanoff, 1990. "Payments system risk issues in a global economy," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation 90-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  3. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
  4. Moen, Jon & Tallman, Ellis W., 1992. "The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(03), pages 611-630, September.
  5. Stephen D. Smith & Larry D. Wall, 1992. "Financial panics, bank failures, and the role of regulatory policy," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Jan, pages 1-11.
  6. Wall, Larry D. & Peterson, David R., 1990. "The effect of Continental Illinois' failure on the financial performance of other banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-99, August.
  7. Portes,, 1987. "Threats to International Financial Stability," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521347891, April.
  8. Dickinson, Amy & Peterson, David R & Christiansen, William A, 1991. "An Empirical Investigation into the Failure of First RepublicBank: Is There a Contagion Effect?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 303-18, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mayes, David G., 2004. "Who pays for bank insolvency?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 515-551, April.
  2. Abreu, José Filipe & Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim, 2013. "The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 49-72.
  3. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 2005. "Too big to fail after all these years," Staff Reports 220, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  4. Walker F. Todd, 1993. "FDICIA's emergency liquidity provisions," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 16-23.
  5. Lazarus Angbazo & Anthony Saunders, . "The Effect of TBTF Deregulation on Bank Cost of Funds," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-25, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Akhigbe, Aigbe & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2001. "The impact of FDICIA on bank returns and risk: Evidence from the capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 393-417, February.
  7. Pop, Adrian & Pop, Diana, 2009. "Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1429-1459, November.
  8. Marco Del Negro & Stephen Kay, 2002. "Global banks, local crises: bad news from Argentina," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q3, pages 89-106.
  9. C. H. Furfine, 2001. "The costs and benefits of moral suasion: Evidence from the rescue of long-term capital management," BIS Working Papers 103, Bank for International Settlements.
  10. William R. Emmons, 1995. "Interbank netting agreement and the distribution of bank default risk," Working Papers 1995-016, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2000. "The evolution of "too-big-to-fail" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 00-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  12. Larry D. Wall, 2012. "Central banking for financial stability Some lessons from the recent instability in the US and euro area," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 8(3), pages 247-280, August.
  13. Wall, Larry D., 2012. "Central Banking for Financial Stability: Some Lessons from the Recent Instability in the United States and Euro Area," ADBI Working Papers 379, Asian Development Bank Institute.
  14. John R. Walter, 1998. "Can a safety net subsidy be contained?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 1-20.

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