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Information transfers among co-owned firms

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  • Massa, Massimo
  • Žaldokas, Alminas

Abstract

We study how lenders in blockheld firms exploit the information on the other holdings of equity blockholders to learn their attitude toward creditors. In the presence of the conflict of interest between lenders and equityholders, information on how blockholders behave in the other firms they control provides the lenders with key information about potential blockholder behavior. We test this hypothesis using data on US public firms over the 2001–2008 period. We show that the financial conditions of these co-owned firms affect how lenders value other firms in which the owner has a major stake. Bad news on credit quality in co-owned firms raise the firm's credit risk. Our identification is based on the instrumental variables estimation where we instrument the changes in credit risk of co-owned firms by the natural disaster events in the counties of co-owned firm headquarters.

Suggested Citation

  • Massa, Massimo & Žaldokas, Alminas, 2017. "Information transfers among co-owned firms," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 77-92.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:31:y:2017:i:c:p:77-92
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.11.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kang, Jun-Koo & Luo, Juan & Na, Hyun Seung, 2018. "Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(3), pages 576-602.
    3. Gilje, Erik P. & Gormley, Todd A. & Levit, Doron, 2020. "Who's paying attention? Measuring common ownership and its impact on managerial incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 152-178.
    4. Lin, Luca Xianran, 2022. "Great Trees are Good for Shade: Creditor Monitoring Under Common Ownership," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    5. Hennig, Jan C. & Oehmichen, Jana & Steinberg, Philip J. & Heigermoser, Judith, 2022. "Determinants of common ownership: Exploring an information-based and a competition-based perspective in a global context," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 690-702.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information transfer; Blocks; Cost of debt; Comovement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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