IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v33y2015icp212-226.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The family business map: Framework, selective survey, and evidence from Chinese family firm succession

Author

Listed:
  • Bennedsen, Morten
  • Fan, Joseph P.H.
  • Jian, Ming
  • Yeh, Yin-Hua

Abstract

This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of founding family engagement in firm ownership and management. We hypothesize that families manage their firms because they are able to make contributions that non-family managers cannot provide. However, roadblocks arising from within the family, from markets, and from surrounding institutions challenge family ownership. We propose a new framework for organizing these assets and roadblocks, called the family business map; this framework is useful for categorizing the papers presented in this Special Issue. We support the predictions of the framework with evidence from Chinese family firm succession, and conclude that family firm organization is an adaptation to environmental opportunities and constraints. We end the paper with suggestions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennedsen, Morten & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Jian, Ming & Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2015. "The family business map: Framework, selective survey, and evidence from Chinese family firm succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 212-226.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:33:y:2015:i:c:p:212-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119915000097
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2201, October.
    2. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    3. Anderson, Ronald C. & Mansi, Sattar A. & Reeb, David M., 2003. "Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 263-285, May.
    4. Ronald W. Masulis & Peter Kien Pham & Jason Zein, 2011. "Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(11), pages 3556-3600.
    5. Randall Morck & David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease?," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 319-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Shuping Chen & Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng, 2008. "Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 499-536, June.
    7. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    8. Smith, Brian F. & Amoako-Adu, Ben, 1999. "Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 341-368, December.
    9. Morck, Randall K. (ed.), 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226536781, December.
    10. Joseph P. H. Fan & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2012. "Translating Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into Sustained Prosperity," NBER Chapters, in: Capitalizing China, pages 1-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall & Shim, Jungwook & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 840-854.
    12. Randall K. Morck, 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc00-1, March.
    13. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    15. Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2637-2680, December.
    16. Stijn Claessens & Joseph P. H. Fan, 2002. "Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 71-103, June.
    17. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    18. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Woidtke, Tracie, 2005. "Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1857-1885, July.
    19. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fausto Panunzi, 2010. "Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2414-2450, December.
    20. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    21. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, June.
    22. D'Aurizio, Leandro & Oliviero, Tommaso & Romano, Livio, 2015. "Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a financial crisis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 279-292.
    23. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    24. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wei, K.C. John & Xu, Xinzhong, 2011. "Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 207-214, April.
    25. Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Lester, Richard H. & Cannella Jr., Albert A., 2007. "Are family firms really superior performers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 829-858, December.
    26. Cao, Jerry & Cumming, Douglas & Wang, Xiaoming, 2015. "One-child policy and family firms in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 317-329.
    27. Xu, Nianhang & Yuan, Qingbo & Jiang, Xuanyu & Chan, Kam C., 2015. "Founder's political connections, second generation involvement, and family firm performance: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 243-259.
    28. Joseph P.H. Fan & T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, 2012. "Founder Succession and Accounting Properties," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 283-311, March.
    29. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    30. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    31. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "Pay-out policies in founding family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 330-344.
    32. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    33. Bertrand, Marianne & Johnson, Simon & Samphantharak, Krislert & Schoar, Antoinette, 2008. "Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 466-498, June.
    34. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    35. Andres, Christian, 2008. "Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 431-445, September.
    36. Bach, Laurent & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas, 2015. "CEO identity and labor contracts: Evidence from CEO transitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 227-242.
    37. Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan & Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "The Value of Marriage to Family Firms," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 611-636, April.
    38. Pinheiro, Roberto & Yung, Chris, 2015. "CEOs in family firms: Does junior know what he's doing?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 345-361.
    39. Stacchini, Massimiliano & Degasperi, Petra, 2015. "Trust, family businesses and financial intermediation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 293-316.
    40. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    41. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2006. "The Role of Family in Family Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    42. Jiang, Fuxiu & Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Zhang, Min, 2015. "Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 260-278.
    43. Maury, Benjamin, 2006. "Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 321-341, January.
    44. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pombo, Carlos & Trujillo, María-Andrea, 2012. "Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 626-649.
    2. Jiang, Fuxiu & Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Zhang, Min, 2015. "Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 260-278.
    3. Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2019. "Corporate governance and family succession: New evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    4. Fuxiu Jiang & Xiaojia Zheng & Wei Tang, 2018. "Non-family chair and corporate performance," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-30, December.
    5. Pindado, Julio & Requejo, Ignacio & de la Torre, Chabela, 2014. "Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 58-74.
    6. Jameson, Melvin & Prevost, Andrew & Puthenpurackal, John, 2014. "Controlling shareholders, board structure, and firm performance: Evidence from India," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 1-20.
    7. François Belot & Timothée Waxin, 2017. "Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 591-617, December.
    8. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    9. Breuer, Wolfgang & Knetsch, Andreas, 2022. "Informal authority and economic outcomes of family firms: An issue of national power distance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    11. Suveera Gill & Parmjit Kaur, 2015. "Family Involvement in Business and Financial Performance: A Panel Data Analysis," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 40(4), pages 395-420, December.
    12. Christopher Hansen & Joern Block & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2020. "Family Firm Performance Over The Business Cycle: A Meta‐Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 476-511, July.
    13. Saito, Takuji, 2008. "Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 620-646, December.
    14. Xu, Nianhang & Yuan, Qingbo & Jiang, Xuanyu & Chan, Kam C., 2015. "Founder's political connections, second generation involvement, and family firm performance: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 243-259.
    15. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Leung, Winnie S.C., 2020. "The impact of ownership transferability on family firm governance and performance: The case of family trusts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    16. Huang, Haijie & Lee, Edward & Lyu, Changjiang & Zhao, Yiyi, 2020. "Bequest motive, information transparency, and family firm value: A natural experiment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    17. Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2018. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(5), pages 1605-1653.
    18. Johan Eklund & Johanna Palmberg & Daniel Wiberg, 2013. "Inherited corporate control and returns on investment," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 419-431, August.
    19. ElBannan, Mona A., 2017. "Stock market liquidity, family ownership, and capital structure choices in an emerging country," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 201-231.
    20. El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Wang, He & Kwok, Chuck C.Y., 2016. "Family control and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 131-146.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family firms; Family assets; Roadblocks; Succession;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:33:y:2015:i:c:p:212-226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.