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The rise of dual-class stock IPOs

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  • Aggarwal, Dhruv
  • Eldar, Ofer
  • Hochberg, Yael V.
  • Litov, Lubomir P.

Abstract

We create a novel dataset to examine the recent rise in dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights, and that the increasing popularity of dual-class structures is driven by founder-controlled firms. We find that founders’ wedge is greater when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and technological shocks that reduced firms’ needs for external financing. Stronger bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that terminate dual-class structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Aggarwal, Dhruv & Eldar, Ofer & Hochberg, Yael V. & Litov, Lubomir P., 2022. "The rise of dual-class stock IPOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 122-153.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:144:y:2022:i:1:p:122-153
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.12.012
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ewens, Michael, 2022. "Race and Gender in Entrepreneurial Finance," SocArXiv djf8z, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dual-class; Initial public offerings (IPOs); Entrepreneurship; Corporate governance; Venture capital; Private firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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