Although some argue that tokenism drives the selection of female directors, we show that they have a significant impact on measures of board effectiveness. In a large panel of data on publicly-traded firms from 1996-2003, we find that (1) the likelihood that a female director has attendance problems is 0.29 lower than for a male director, (2) male directors have fewer attendance problems the greater the fraction of female directors on the board, (3) firms with more diverse boards provide their directors with more payperformance incentives, and (4) firms with more diverse boards have more board meetings. We also show that the positive relationship between corporate performance measures and gender diversity documented by previous studies is not robust to attempts to address the endogeneity of diversity. Instead, the average effect of gender diversity on both market valuation and operating performance appears to be negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with greater shareholder rights. In firms with weaker shareholder rights, gender diversity has positive effects. Our results suggest that diverse boards are tougher monitors. Nevertheless, mandating gender quotas in the boardroom may not increase board effectiveness on average, but may reduce it for well-governed firms where additional monitoring is counterproductive.
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Paper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number
2008-7.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bennedsen, Morten & Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2007.
"Do CEOs matter?,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2006-21, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
Bennedsen, Morten & Pérez-González, Francisco & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2007.
"Do CEOs Matter?,"
Working Papers
13-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2005.
"Do Directors Perform for Pay?,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2005-2, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007.
"A Theory of Friendly Boards,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)