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Board dynamics over the startup life cycle

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  • Malenko, Nadya
  • Ewens, Michael

Abstract

We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when control becomes shared, and hold a tie-breaking vote. Their presence is particularly likely when the potential for VC-entrepreneur conflicts is higher. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to startup performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Malenko, Nadya & Ewens, Michael, 2022. "Board dynamics over the startup life cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 15024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15024
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    1. Matthew R. Denes & Sabrina T. Howell & Filippo Mezzanotti & Xinxin Wang & Ting Xu, 2020. "Investor Tax Credits and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 27751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Banal-Estañol, Albert & Macho-Stadler, Inés & Nieto-Postigo, Jonás & Pérez-Castrillo, David, 2023. "Early individual stakeholders, first venture capital investment, and exit in the UK startup ecosystem," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    3. Zaccaria, Luana, 2023. "Are family and friends the wrong investors? Evidence from U.S. start-ups," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    4. Ting Yao & Hugh O'Neill, 2022. "Venture capital exit pressure and venture exit: A board perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(13), pages 2829-2848, December.
    5. Qiuwei Li & Wei Zhou & Hui Zhou & Jiaxuan Chen, 2021. "Do Board Characteristics Matter for Growth Firms? Evidence from China," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-9, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Venture capital; Corporate governance; Board of directors; Independent directors; Allocation of control; Mediation role;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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