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Do real estate agents have information advantages in housing markets?

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  • Agarwal, Sumit
  • He, Jia
  • Sing, Tien Foo
  • Song, Changcheng

Abstract

We use a large housing transaction data set in Singapore to study whether real estate agents use information advantages to buy houses at bargain prices. Agents bought their own houses at prices that are 2.54% lower than comparable houses bought by other buyers. Consistent with information asymmetries, agent buyers have more information advantages in less informative environments, and agent buyers are more likely to buy houses from agent sellers. Agent discounts are from both “cherry picking” and bargaining power, and bargaining power contributes more to the agent discounts. Agents’ advantage consists in their information of available houses and previous purchase prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Agarwal, Sumit & He, Jia & Sing, Tien Foo & Song, Changcheng, 2019. "Do real estate agents have information advantages in housing markets?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 715-735.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:134:y:2019:i:3:p:715-735
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.008
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    Cited by:

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    3. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    4. Füss, Roland & Ruf, Daniel, 2022. "Information precision and return co-movements in private commercial real estate markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
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    6. Anthony Lepinteur & Giorgia Menta & Sofie R. Waltl, 2023. "Equal Price for Equal Place? Demand-Driven Racial Discrimination in the Housing Market," LISER Working Paper Series 2023-09, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
    7. Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Bennie D. Waller & Scott A. Wentland, 2022. "Mitigating agency costs in the housing market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(3), pages 829-861, September.
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    9. Josep Maria Raya Vilchez & Aleksander Kucel, 2023. "How fiscal policy affects housing market dynamics: Evidence from Spain," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 323-347, April.
    10. Chris Cunningham & Kristopher Gerardi & Lily Shen, 2022. "The Good, the Bad, and the Ordinary: Estimating Agent Value-Added Using Real Estate Transactions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2022-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    11. Andrew Hanson & Zackary Hawley, 2023. "Restricted access: Real estate agent response to client race, ethnicity, gender, and side of market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(4), pages 855-890, July.
    12. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Yanting Wu & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 130-169, January.
    13. Turnbull, Geoffrey K. & van der Vlist, Arno J., 2022. "The price of ignorance: Foreclosures, uninformed buyers and house prices," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    14. Popov, Alexander, 2022. "The division of spoils in a booming industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 341-369.
    15. Kim, Hayoung, 2022. "Heterogeneous effects of information disclosure: Evidence from housing markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 359-380.
    16. Luis Arturo Lopez, 2021. "Asymmetric information and personal affiliations in brokered housing transactions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 459-492, June.
    17. Fang Zhang & Hang Zhang & Yun Zhang, 2023. "Trust premium in the second-hand housing market: evidence from the negotiation rate," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, December.
    18. Augustinas Maceika & Andrej Bugajev & Olga Regina Šostak & Tatjana Vilutienė, 2021. "Decision Tree and AHP Methods Application for Projects Assessment: A Case Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(10), pages 1-33, May.
    19. Han, Yang & Zhang, Haotian & Zhao, Yong, 2021. "Structural evolution of real estate industry in China: 2002-2017," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 45-56.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Housing market; Real estate agents; Information advantages; Bargaining power; Market distortion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General

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