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Asymmetric information and personal affiliations in brokered housing transactions

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  • Luis Arturo Lopez

Abstract

This research provides evidence on the role of information asymmetry and personal affiliations in housing transactions using a novel dataset that allows observation of detailed information about the property, broker, and seller. Sellers holding a real estate license are found to obtain about 1.6% (or $3,200) more for their properties than unlicensed sellers, and sellers personally affiliated to a real estate licensee (e.g., spouses, siblings, parents) also obtain a premium of about the same size, all else equal. There is evidence from appraisal training that knowledge of property valuation further increases the price disparities, while informative public property records reduce price disparities. Agents and personal affiliates of agents appear to use information advantages to time the market and capture capital gains. These new findings provide insights into the behaviors of market participants in asymmetric information environments.

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  • Luis Arturo Lopez, 2021. "Asymmetric information and personal affiliations in brokered housing transactions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 459-492, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:49:y:2021:i:2:p:459-492
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12325
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    4. Lopez, Luis A. & Yoshida, Jiro, 2022. "Estimating housing rent depreciation for inflation adjustments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
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    6. Luis Arturo Lopez & Shawn J. McCoy & Vivek Sah, 2022. "Steering consumers to lenders in residential real estate markets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(6), pages 1596-1641, November.
    7. Conklin, James N. & Edward Coulson, N. & Diop, Moussa & Mota, Nuno, 2023. "An Alternative Approach to Estimating Foreclosure and Short Sale Discounts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).

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