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Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

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  • Li, Duozhe
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4MFK47G-1/2/aa675863cce33e9c81ad1347a5aab545
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 (September)
    Pages: 695-708

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:695-708

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    3. Spiegler, Ran, 2002. "Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-Based Choice in Extensive-Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 691-706, July.
    4. Compte, Olivier & Jehiel, Philippe, 2003. "Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 334-342, October.
    5. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
    6. Ran Spiegler, 2003. "Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000208, David K. Levine.
    7. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
    9. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. Driesen Bram & Perea Andrés & Peters Hans, 2009. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Driesen Bram & Perea Andrés & Peters Hans, 2009. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2010. "Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?," MPRA Paper 27444, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2008. "Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation," Working Papers tecipa-311, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    6. Kyle Hyndman, 2011. "Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 527-549, August.
    7. Britz, Volker, 2013. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 345-351.
    8. Britz Volker, 2010. "Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.

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