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Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

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  • Ran Spiegler

Abstract

I explore the idea that people care about the justifiability of their decisions in the context of two-person extensive games. Each player justifies his strategy s with a belief b of the opponent's strategy which is consistent with the play path and maximally plausible (according to some exogenous criterion). We say that s is justifiable if against the ex post criticism that some other strategy s′ outperforms s against b, the player can argue that playing s′ would have exposed him to similar criticism in the opposite direction. Under a simplicity-based plausibility criterion, this concept implies systematic departures from maximizing behaviour in familiar games. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00222
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 691-706

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:3:p:691-706

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Cited by:
  1. Spiegler, R., 2001. "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Papers 2001-28, Tel Aviv.
  2. Maenner, Eliot, 2008. "Adaptation and complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 166-187, May.
  3. Basov Suren & Danilkina Svetlana, 2007. "Auctions with Opportunistic Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-11, November.
  4. Sandroni, Alvaro & Cherepavov, Vadim & Feddersen, Timothy, 2013. "Rationalization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  5. Lombardi, Michele, 2009. "Reason-based choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 58-66, January.
  6. Ran Spiegler, 2003. "Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000208, David K. Levine.
  7. Li, Duozhe, 2007. "Bargaining with history-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 695-708, September.

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