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Instrument choice in a fishery

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  • Boyce, John R.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 183-206

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:183-206

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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  1. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  2. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
  3. Paul A. Samuelson, 1974. "Is the Rent-Collector Worthy of His Full Hire?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 7-10, January.
  4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
  6. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
  7. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
  8. K. Criddle & S. Macinko, . "A requiem for the IFQ in U.S. fisheries," Working Papers 2000-23, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Jonathan M. Karpoff, 1989. "Characteristics of Limited Entry Fisheries and the Option Component of Entry Licenses," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(4), pages 386-393.
  10. Matulich, Scott C. & Mittelhammer, Ron C. & Reberte, Carlos, 1996. "Toward a More Complete Model of Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas: Implications of Incorporating the Processing Sector," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 112-128, July.
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  12. Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1987. "Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource Management: The Case of the Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 179-94, February.
  13. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David M. McEvoy & Sylvia Brandt & Sven Anders, 2009. "The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(3), pages 470-484.
  2. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
  3. Matthew N. Reimer & Joshua K. Abbott & James E. Wilen, 2013. "Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas," Working Papers 2013-03, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
  4. Jean-Christophe PEREAU (GREThA, UMR CNRS 5113) & Luc DOYEN (CNRS-MNHN, CNRS, UMR 7204) & Rich LITTLE (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research) & Olivier THEBAUD (CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research), 2011. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with Individual Transferable Quotas," Cahiers du GREThA 2011-01, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
  5. Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2008. "Linking dynamic economic and ecological general equilibrium models," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 91-114, May.
  6. Deacon, Robert T. & Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2011. "Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 366-380, May.
  7. MacGregor, James & Karousakis, Katia & Groom, Ben, 2004. "Using Economic Incentives to Conserve CITES-listed Species: A Scoping Study on ITQs for Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea," Discussion Papers 24139, International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme.
  8. HIGASHIDA Keisaku & TAKARADA Yasuhiro, 2009. "Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) Systems and Input and Stock Controls," Discussion papers 09046, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  9. John Boyce, 2010. "Putting Foxes in Charge of the Hen-House: The Political Economy of Harvest Quota Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 475-493, August.

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