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Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

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  • Matthew N. Reimer

    ()
    (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage)

  • Joshua K. Abbott

    ()
    (School of Sustainability, Arizona State University)

  • James E. Wilen

    ()
    (Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis)

Abstract

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along the both the extensive margin—via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels—and the intensive margin, as harvesters adjust their behavior to ITQ incentives. We use ITQ introduction in the Bering Sea crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins. We embed an empirically calibrated structural model of the harvesting process into a sector-level model, allowing us to experimentally "unravel" the ITQ treatment. We show that the magnitude and source of rent generation under ITQs critically depends on the manner and degree of rent dissipation before ITQs are implemented.

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File URL: http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201303.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-03.

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Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Publication status: forthcoming Land Economics
Handle: RePEc:ala:wpaper:2013-03

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Web page: http://www.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/CBPPHome/DepartmentsandMajors/Economics.aspx
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Keywords: fisheries; ITQ; production function; intensive margin; Alaska; crab;

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  16. Marcoul, Philippe & Weninger, Quinn, 2008. "Search and Active Learning with Correlated Information: Empirical Evidence from Mid-Atlantic Clam Fishermen," Staff General Research Papers 11601, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  17. Copes, Parzival & Charles, Anthony T., 2004. "Socioeconomics of Individual Transferable Quotas and Community-Based Fishery Management," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 33(2), October.
  18. Weninger, Quinn & Waters, James R., 2003. "Economic Benefits of Management Reform in the Northern Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery," Staff General Research Papers 10828, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  20. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
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