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The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive

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  • David M. McEvoy
  • Sylvia Brandt
  • Sven Anders

Abstract

In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none has considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. Addressing this question, we find that although fishermen should expect to gain from ITQs under perfect competition, they may suffer welfare losses if the processing sector is imperfectly competitive.

Suggested Citation

  • David M. McEvoy & Sylvia Brandt & Sven Anders, 2009. "The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(3), pages 470-484.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:85:y:2009:i:3:p:470-484
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    2. Mukherjee, Zinnia, 2015. "An economic approach to understanding the international transfer of bycatch from unilateral bycatch reduction policies," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 190-195.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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