David M. McEvoy () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst) Sylvia Brandt () Nathalie Lavoie () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst) Sven Anders () (Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta Edmonton)
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In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the implementation of ITQs.
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Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2007-3.
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