IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbrese/v118y2020icp26-37.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate governance and firms’ acquisition behavior: The role of antitakeover provisions

Author

Listed:
  • Malhotra, Shavin
  • Morgan, Horatio M.
  • Zhu, Pengcheng

Abstract

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are strategically important investments that can drive corporate growth and development. However, they offer uncertain payoffs over the long term and could cost top executives their jobs when results are disappointing. As a result, risk-averse top executives can be reluctant to strategically decide to support even promising M&As. We integrate insights from upper echelon and managerial risk-aversion perspectives to determine whether and when antitakeover provisions can foster firms’ acquisition frequency. Drawing on a sample of 8438 M&As by 1301 public companies in the United States, we report evidence that these provisions positively affect firms’ acquisition frequency. We also find that the positive impact of these provisions on firms’ acquisition frequency is weaker when chief executive officers own a larger proportion of their firms’ equity and when firms operate in industries with higher competition. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Malhotra, Shavin & Morgan, Horatio M. & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2020. "Corporate governance and firms’ acquisition behavior: The role of antitakeover provisions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 26-37.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:118:y:2020:i:c:p:26-37
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.06.035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296320304094
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.06.035?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Motivating Innovation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1823-1860, October.
    3. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1992. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 350-365, Autumn.
    4. Stráska, Miroslava & Waller, Gregory, 2010. "Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 487-497, September.
    5. Joe S. Bain, 1951. "Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936–1940," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 65(3), pages 293-324.
    6. Huyghebaert, Nancy & Luypaert, Mathieu, 2010. "Antecedents of growth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from Belgium," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 392-403, April.
    7. Ferreira, Manuel Portugal & Santos, João Carvalho & de Almeida, Martinho Isnard Ribeiro & Reis, Nuno Rosa, 2014. "Mergers & acquisitions research: A bibliometric study of top strategy and international business journals, 1980–2010," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(12), pages 2550-2558.
    8. Tomi Laamanen & Thomas Keil, 2008. "Performance of serial acquirers: toward an acquisition program perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(6), pages 663-672, June.
    9. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    10. Jen Baggs & Jean‐Etienne De Bettignies, 2007. "Product Market Competition And Agency Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-323, June.
    11. Malmendier, Ulrike & Tate, Geoffrey, 2008. "Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 20-43, July.
    12. Onali, Enrico & Galiakhmetova, Ramilya & Molyneux, Philip & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2016. "CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 89-117.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    14. David R. King & Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Daily & Jeffrey G. Covin, 2004. "Meta‐analyses of post‐acquisition performance: indications of unidentified moderators," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 187-200, February.
    15. Klaus M. Schmidt, 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 191-213.
    16. Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, 2001. "Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of acquiring firms: a longitudinal study," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 197-220, March.
    17. Bhojraj, Sanjeev & Sengupta, Partha & Zhang, Suning, 2017. "Takeover defenses: Entrenchment and efficiency," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 142-160.
    18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, 2002. "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy," NBER Working Papers 8974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Jay Dahya & A. Alasdair Lonie & David M. Power, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(9-10), pages 1089-1118.
    20. Jay B. Barney & Nicolai J. Foss & Jacob Lyngsie, 2018. "The role of senior management in opportunity formation: Direct involvement or reactive selection?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 1325-1349, May.
    21. Straska, Miroslava & Waller, H. Gregory, 2014. "Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 933-956, August.
    22. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Balakrishnan, Karthik & Cohen, Daniel, 2012. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-204.
    23. Michael J. Mannor & Adam J. Wowak & Viva Ona Bartkus & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, 2016. "Heavy lies the crown? How job anxiety affects top executive decision making in gain and loss contexts," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1968-1989, September.
    24. Kim, E. Han & Lu, Yao, 2011. "CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 272-292.
    25. Jay B. Barney, 1988. "Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: Reconsidering the relatedness hypothesis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(S1), pages 71-78, June.
    26. Yuanzhi Luo, 2005. "Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1951-1982, August.
    27. William C. Johnson & Sungwoo Nam & Sangho Yi, 2019. "The commitment value of takeover defenses," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 79-100, January.
    28. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    29. Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal & Stefan Ruenzi, 2014. "CEO Ownership, Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(3), pages 1013-1050, June.
    30. Guoli Chen & Craig Crossland & Sterling Huang, 2016. "Female board representation and corporate acquisition intensity," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 303-313, February.
    31. Chang, Ya-Kai & Chen, Yu-Lun & Chou, Robin K. & Huang, Tai-Hsin, 2015. "Corporate governance, product market competition and dynamic capital structure," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 44-55.
    32. Levi, Maurice & Li, Kai & Zhang, Feng, 2014. "Director gender and mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 185-200.
    33. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
    34. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    35. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Peyer, Urs C., 2011. "The CEO pay slice," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 199-221, October.
    36. Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 2014. "How Do Industry Peers Respond to Control Threats?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(2), pages 380-399, February.
    37. Moeller, Sara B. & Schlingemann, Frederik P. & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Firm size and the gains from acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 201-228, August.
    38. Harford, Jarrad & Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Powell, Ronan, 2012. "The sources of value destruction in acquisitions by entrenched managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 247-261.
    39. Moeller, Thomas, 2005. "Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 167-190, April.
    40. William Ocasio, 1997. "Towards An Attention‐Based View Of The Firm," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(S1), pages 187-206, July.
    41. Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
    42. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
    43. Kenneth M. Lehn & Mengxin Zhao, 2006. "CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1759-1811, August.
    44. Giroud, Xavier & Mueller, Holger M., 2010. "Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 312-331, March.
    45. Theresa S. Cho & Donald C. Hambrick, 2006. "Attention as the Mediator Between Top Management Team Characteristics and Strategic Change: The Case of Airline Deregulation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 453-469, August.
    46. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, 2009. "What Matters in Corporate Governance?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 783-827, February.
    47. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2013. "Learning from repetitive acquisitions: Evidence from the time between deals," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 99-117.
    48. Yim, Soojin, 2013. "The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 250-273.
    49. Jay Dahya & A. Alasdair Lonie & David M. Power, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(9‐10), pages 1089-1118, November.
    50. Nihat Aktas & Eric de Bodt & Richard Roll, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding : An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Post-Print hal-02312633, HAL.
    51. Ryngaert, Michael, 1988. "The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 377-417, January.
    52. Tang, Jianmin, 2006. "Competition and innovation behaviour," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 68-82, February.
    53. Saeed Khanagha & Mohammad Taghi Ramezan Zadeh & Oli R. Mihalache & Henk W. Volberda, 2018. "Embracing Bewilderment: Responding to Technological Disruption in Heterogeneous Market Environments," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(7), pages 1079-1121, November.
    54. Kathleen Fuller & Jeffry Netter & Mike Stegemoller, 2002. "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1763-1793, August.
    55. Campbell, T. Colin & Gallmeyer, Michael & Johnson, Shane A. & Rutherford, Jessica & Stanley, Brooke W., 2011. "CEO optimism and forced turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 695-712, September.
    56. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Simpson, Joseph J. & Sariol, Marcie, 2022. "Uncertainty, entrepreneurial orientation, and the pursuit of M&A: Managing the unpredictable," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 423-434.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2019. "Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 650-699.
    2. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2019. "Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions," Other publications TiSEM 9baa3ffc-67cb-4647-9da5-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. El-Khatib, Rwan & Fogel, Kathy & Jandik, Tomas, 2015. "CEO network centrality and merger performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 349-382.
    4. Xu, Weidong & Gao, Xin & Li, Donghui & Zhuang, Mingming & Yang, Shijie, 2022. "Serial acquirers and stock price crash risk: International evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Carline, Nicholas F. & Gogineni, Sridhar, 2021. "Antitakeover provisions and investment in mergers and acquisitions: A causal reevaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl & Shin, Sean Seunghun, 2020. "Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 68-87.
    7. Drobetz, W. & Momtaz, Paul P., 2020. "Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Value: New Evidence from the M&A Market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    8. Doan, Minh Phuong & Sercu, Piet, 2021. "Modelling multiperiod patterns in stock-market reactions to events, with an application to serial acquisitions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    9. Jaffe, Jeffrey & Pedersen, David & Voetmann, Torben, 2013. "Skill differences in corporate acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 166-181.
    10. Andreou, Panayiotis C. & Doukas, John A. & Koursaros, Demetris & Louca, Christodoulos, 2019. "Valuation effects of overconfident CEOs on corporate diversification and refocusing decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 182-204.
    11. Chikh, Sabrina & Filbien, Jean-Yves, 2011. "Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1221-1236.
    12. Chung, Chune Young & Kim, Incheol & Rabarison, Monika K. & To, Thomas Y. & Wu, Eliza, 2020. "Shareholder litigation rights and corporate acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    13. Mishra, Chandra S., 2020. "Are frequent acquirers more entrenched?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Kanungo, Rama Prasad, 2021. "Uncertainty of M&As under asymmetric estimation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 774-793.
    15. Guernsey, Scott & Sepe, Simone M. & Serfling, Matthew, 2022. "Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1070-1096.
    16. Yang Zhang, 2018. "Corporate Governance Effects on Risk Management and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions," PhD Thesis, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 4-2018.
    17. Huang, Qianqian & Jiang, Feng & Wu, Szu-Yin (Jennifer), 2018. "Does short-maturity debt discipline managers? Evidence from cash-rich firms' acquisition decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 133-154.
    18. Marco Becht & Andrea Polo & Stefano Rossi, 2016. "Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(11), pages 3035-3067.
    19. Hwang, Hyoseok (David) & Kim, Hyun-Dong & Kim, Taeyeon, 2020. "The blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    20. Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam & Chia‐Feng (Jeffrey) Yu & Ralf Zurbruegg, 2020. "Does market power discipline CEO power? An agency perspective," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(3), pages 724-752, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:118:y:2020:i:c:p:26-37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.