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Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers

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  • Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl
  • Shin, Sean Seunghun

Abstract

We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and​ board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm’s future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures.

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  • Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl & Shin, Sean Seunghun, 2020. "Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 68-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:59:y:2020:i:c:p:68-87
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2020.09.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Product market competition; Takeover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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