IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v130y2021ics0378426621001527.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tournament incentives and IPO failure risk

Author

Listed:
  • Colak, Gonul
  • Gounopoulos, Dimitrios
  • Loukopoulos, Panagiotis
  • Loukopoulos, Georgios

Abstract

This study tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives play a major role in lowering the failure risk of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and its subordinate executives, we find that an interquartile change in the distribution of the CEO pay gap translates into a decline in failure risk probability by approximately 27%. The results are driven by the long-term rather than the short-term component of exective pay. Our results hold in an instrumental-variable setting that exploits exogenous variation in the likelihood of employing intra-firm, tournament-based, promotion incentives. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the negative link between tournament incentives and IPO failure is more pronounced when internal promotion contests are more likely to occur. Finally, we document that CEO pay gap is associated with superior long-run operating performance and greater investment efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Colak, Gonul & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Loukopoulos, Panagiotis & Loukopoulos, Georgios, 2021. "Tournament incentives and IPO failure risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:130:y:2021:i:c:s0378426621001527
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106193
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426621001527
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106193?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Wulf, Julie, 2006. "Are perks purely managerial excess?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-33, January.
    3. Baker, George P & Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1988. " Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 593-616, July.
    4. Biddle, Gary C. & Hilary, Gilles & Verdi, Rodrigo S., 2009. "How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 112-131, December.
    5. Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018. "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-60.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    7. Hainmueller, Jens, 2012. "Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 25-46, January.
    8. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    9. Brisker, Eric R. & Autore, Don M. & Colak, Gonul & Peterson, David R., 2014. "Executive compensation structure and the motivations for seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 330-345.
    10. Bognanno, Michael L, 2001. "Corporate Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 290-315, April.
    11. Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, 2008. "Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2737-2784, December.
    12. Richard A. Bettis & Constance E. Helfat & J. Myles Shaver & Clint Chadwick & James P. Guthrie & Xuejing Xing, 2016. "The HR executive effect on firm performance and survival," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(11), pages 2346-2361, November.
    13. Baranchuk, Nina & Kieschnick, Robert & Moussawi, Rabih, 2014. "Motivating innovation in newly public firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 578-588.
    14. Douglas A. Hensler & Ronald C. Rutherford & Thomas M. Springer, 1997. "The Survival Of Initial Public Offerings In The Aftermarket," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 93-110, March.
    15. Johnson, William C. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Yi, Sangho, 2015. "The bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses: Evidence from IPO firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 307-332.
    16. Kin Lee & Baruch Lev & Gillian Yeo, 2008. "Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 315-338, April.
    17. Mark J. Garmaise, 2011. "Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 376-425.
    18. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 2004. "New lists: Fundamentals and survival rates," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 229-269, August.
    19. Custódio, Cláudia & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Matos, Pedro, 2013. "Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 471-492.
    20. Camelia M. Kuhnen & Alexandra Niessen, 2012. "Public Opinion and Executive Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(7), pages 1249-1272, July.
    21. Yung, Chris & Çolak, Gönül & Wei Wang, 2008. "Cycles in the IPO market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 192-208, July.
    22. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017. "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 23596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Bharat A. Jain & Omesh Kini, 2000. "Does the Presence of Venture Capitalists Improve the Survival Profile of IPO Firms?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(9&10), pages 1139-1183.
    24. Michael Ewens & Matt Marx, 2018. "Founder Replacement and Startup Performance," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1532-1565.
    25. Indrarini Laksmana, 2008. "Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Compensation Practices," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 25(4), pages 1147-1182, December.
    26. Chen, Jing & Ezzamel, Mahmoud & Cai, Ziming, 2011. "Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1176-1199, September.
    27. Chahine, Salim & Goergen, Marc, 2014. "Top management ties with board members: How they affect pay–performance sensitivity and IPO performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 99-115.
    28. Bharat A. Jain & Omesh Kini, 2000. "Does the Presence of Venture Capitalists Improve the Survival Profile of IPO Firms?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(9‐10), pages 1139-1183, November.
    29. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Borisov, Alexander & Yu, Xiaoyun, 2015. "Firm Mortality and Natal Financial Care," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(1-2), pages 61-88, April.
    30. Yonca Ertimur & Caleb Rawson & Jonathan L. Rogers & Sarah L. C. Zechman, 2018. "Bridging the Gap: Evidence from Externally Hired CEOs," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 521-579, May.
    31. Cutillas Gomariz, Mª Fuensanta & Sánchez Ballesta, Juan Pedro, 2014. "Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and investment efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 494-506.
    32. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    33. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    34. Faulkender, Michael & Yang, Jun, 2010. "Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 257-270, May.
    35. Kini, Omesh & Williams, Ryan, 2012. "Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 350-376.
    36. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    37. Lowry, Michelle & Murphy, Kevin J., 2007. "Executive stock options and IPO underpricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 39-65, July.
    38. Bergstresser, Daniel & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 511-529, June.
    39. Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal & Stefan Ruenzi, 2014. "CEO Ownership, Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(3), pages 1013-1050, June.
    40. Haß, Lars Helge & Müller, Maximilian A. & Vergauwe, Skrålan, 2015. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 251-267.
    41. Todd A. Gormley & David A. Matsa, 2014. "Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(2), pages 617-661.
    42. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Peyer, Urs C., 2011. "The CEO pay slice," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 199-221, October.
    43. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2010. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 893-922, October.
    44. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
    45. Bharat A. Jain & Omesh Kini, 2008. "The Impact of Strategic Investment Choices on Post-Issue Operating Performance and Survival of US IPO Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3-4), pages 459-490.
    46. Raheja, Charu G., 2005. "Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 283-306, June.
    47. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Kong, Lei & Krishnan, Karthik & Yu, Qianqian, 2019. "Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobility, and Corporate Innovation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(6), pages 2383-2422, December.
    48. Matt Marx & Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, 2009. "Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(6), pages 875-889, June.
    49. Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2002. "Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1857-1889, October.
    50. Hoitash, Udi & Mkrtchyan, Anahit, 2018. "Recruiting the CEO from the Board: Determinants and Consequences," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1261-1295, June.
    51. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Gang Hu & Jiekun Huang, 2010. "The Role of Institutional Investors in Initial Public Offerings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4496-4540, December.
    52. Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, 2004. "Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
    53. Baker, Malcolm & Gompers, Paul A, 2003. "The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 569-598, October.
    54. Butler, Alexander W. & Keefe, Michael O'Connor & Kieschnick, Robert, 2014. "Robust determinants of IPO underpricing and their implications for IPO research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 367-383.
    55. Bharat A. Jain & Omesh Kini, 2008. "The Impact of Strategic Investment Choices on Post‐Issue Operating Performance and Survival of US IPO Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3‐4), pages 459-490, April.
    56. Elizabeth Demers & Philip Joos, 2007. "IPO Failure Risk," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 333-371, May.
    57. Dong, Zhiyong & Wang, Cong & Xie, Fei, 2010. "Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2518-2529, October.
    58. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    59. Chen, Zhihong & Huang, Yuan & Wei, K. C. John, 2013. "Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 849-885, June.
    60. Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Pham, Hang, 2018. "Specialist CEOs and IPO survival," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 217-243.
    61. García, Diego & Norli, Øyvind, 2012. "Geographic dispersion and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 547-565.
    62. Carl Hsin-han Shen & Hao Zhang, 2018. "Tournament Incentives and Firm Innovation," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1515-1548.
    63. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Larcker, David F. & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2013. "The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 327-350.
    64. Phan, Hieu V. & Simpson, Thuy & Nguyen, Hang T., 2017. "Tournament-Based Incentives, Corporate Cash Holdings, and the Value of Cash," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1519-1550, August.
    65. Steven Klepper, 2002. "The capabilities of new firms and the evolution of the US automobile industry," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(4), pages 645-666, August.
    66. Jonathan D. Arthurs & Lowell W. Busenitz, 2003. "The Boundaries and Limitations of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory in the Venture Capitalist/Entrepreneur Relationship," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 28(2), pages 145-162, March.
    67. Field, Laura & Lowry, Michelle & Mkrtchyan, Anahit, 2013. "Are busy boards detrimental?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 63-82.
    68. Salim Chahine & Gonul Colak & Iftekhar Hasan & Mohamad Mazboudi, 2020. "Investor relations and IPO performance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 474-512, June.
    69. Chahine, Salim & Goergen, Marc, 2011. "The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1116-1131, September.
    70. Ronald W. Masulis & Shawn Mobbs, 2011. "Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(3), pages 823-872, June.
    71. Burns, Natasha & Minnick, Kristina & Starks, Laura, 2017. "CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences, and Consequences," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 519-551, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dmytro Osiichuk, 2022. "The Driver of Workplace Alienation or the Cost of Effective Stewardship? The Consequences of Wage Gap for Corporate Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-26, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dimitrios Gounopoulos & Georgios Loukopoulos & Panagiotis Loukopoulos, 2021. "CEO education and the ability to raise capital," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 67-99, January.
    2. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
    4. Talavera, Oleksandr & Yin, Shuxing & Zhang, Mao, 2021. "Tournament incentives, age diversity and firm performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 139-162.
    5. Colak, Gonul & Fu, Mengchuan & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2022. "On modeling IPO failure risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    6. Nguyen, Nam H. & Phan, Hieu V. & Phan, Hung V. & Tran, Dung T.T. & Vo, Hong, 2020. "Tournament-based incentives and mergers and acquisitions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    7. Cheong, Chee Seng & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey) & Zurbruegg, Ralf & Brockman, Paul, 2021. "Tournament incentives and institutional ownership," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 418-433.
    8. Peter Cziraki & Dirk Jenter, 2021. "The Market for CEOs," CESifo Working Paper Series 9143, CESifo.
    9. Mahmoud Gad & Trang Nguyen & Mariano Scapin, 2023. "The effect of pay disparities within top management on conservative reporting," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(4), pages 478-504, June.
    10. Tu Nguyen & Jing Zhao, 2021. "Industry tournament incentives and corporate innovation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(9-10), pages 1797-1845, October.
    11. Haß, Lars Helge & Müller, Maximilian A. & Vergauwe, Skrålan, 2015. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 251-267.
    12. Chowdhury, Hasibul & Rahman, Shofiqur, 2023. "Do tournament incentives affect corporate dividend policy?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    13. Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Pham, Hang, 2018. "Specialist CEOs and IPO survival," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 217-243.
    14. Meles, Antonio & Salerno, Dario & Sampagnaro, Gabriele & Fu, Mengchuan, 2021. "The going-public decision and firm risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    15. Mekhaimer, Mohamed & Abakah, Alex Annan & Ibrahim, Awad & Hussainey, Khaled, 2022. "Subordinate executives' horizon and firm policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    16. Shima Amini & Sofia Johan & Eilnaz Kashefi Pour & Abdulkadir Mohamed, 2023. "Employee Welfare, Social Capital, and IPO Firm Survival," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(6), pages 2174-2204, November.
    17. Anagnostopoulou, Seraina C. & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Malikov, Kamran & Pham, Hang, 2021. "Earnings management by classification shifting and IPO survival," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    18. Colak, Gonul & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Loukopoulos, Panagiotis & Loukopoulos, Georgios, 2021. "Political power, local policy uncertainty and IPO pricing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    19. Salim Chahine & Gonul Colak & Iftekhar Hasan & Mohamad Mazboudi, 2020. "Investor relations and IPO performance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 474-512, June.
    20. Shahid Ali & Junrui Zhang & Muhammad Usman & Muhammad Kaleem Khan & Farman Ullah Khan & Muhammad Abubakkar Siddique, 2020. "Do tournament incentives motivate chief executive officers to be socially responsible?," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 35(5), pages 597-619, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO pay gap; Tournament incentives; Initial public offerings; IPO survival;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:130:y:2021:i:c:s0378426621001527. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.